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Science and the Environment: A new enlightenment
Nicholas Maxwell believes that while we have developed an
excellent way of learning about the nature of the universe,
we have so far failed in our attempts to apply this method
to create a civilized world.
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Two great problems of learning confront humanity:
learning about the nature of the universe and our place in it,
and learning how to become civilized.
The first problem was cracked, in essence, in the 17th
century, with the birth of modern science. A method was
discovered for progressively improving knowledge and
understanding of the natural world, the famous empirical
method of science. There is of course much that we still do
not know and understand, three or four centuries after the
birth of modern science; nevertheless, during this time,
science has immensely increased our knowledge and
understanding, at an ever accelerating rate.
But it is much less certain that the second great problem
of learning has been cracked. Many, indeed, doubt that it can
be solved. The 20th century record is not exactly
encouraging. The question arises: Can we learn from our
solution to the first great problem of learning how to solve
the second problem? Can the progress-achieving methods of
science be generalized so that they become fruitfully
applicable to the immense task of making social progress
towards a more civilized world? What kind of inquiry can best
help us learn how to achieve global civilization?
Science without Civilization
What makes these questions especially urgent is that
solving the first great problem of learning without solving
the second is almost bound to put humanity into a situation of
great danger, and has in fact done just that. With rapidly
increasing scientific knowledge comes rapidly increasing
technological know-how, which brings with it an immense
increase in the power to act. In the absence of a solution to
the second great problem of learning, the increase in the
power to act may have good consequences, but will as often as
not have all sorts of harmful consequences, whether intended
or not.
Just this is an all too apparent feature of our world.
Science and technology have been used for human benefit, but
have also been used to wreak havoc, whether intentionally, in
war, or unintentionally, in long-term environmental damage -
a consequence of growth of population, industry and
agriculture, made possible by growth of technology. As long
as humanity's power to act was limited, lack of wisdom, of
enlightenment did not matter too much: humanity lacked the
means to inflict too much damage on the planet. But with the
immense increase in our powers to act that we have achieved in
the last century or so, our powers to destroy have become
unprecedented and terrifying: global wisdom has become, not a
luxury, but a necessity.What is Civilization?
By "civilization", I mean that ideal, realizable social
order (whatever it may be) which we ought to try to attain in
the long term. A little more specifically, I mean a world in
which everyone can share equally in enjoying, sustaining and
creating what is of value in life, insofar as this is
possible. I conjecture, a little more specifically still,
that a civilized world is one which is liberal, democratic,
just, sustainable, egalitarian, peaceful, knowledgeable,
rational and wise, one that tackles problems of human
suffering and deprivation in effective ways, but also one that
sustains friendship, love, kindness, individual freedom,
creativity, adventurousness, great art and science.
The Enlightenment
The idea of learning from the solution to the first great
problem of learning how to solve the second problem goes back
to the Enlightenment of the 18th century. Indeed, this was
the basic idea of the philosophes of the Enlightenment -
Voltaire, Diderot, Condorcet et al.: to learn from scientific
progress how to achieve social progress towards world
enlightenment.
The best of the philosophes did what they could to put
this immensely important idea into practice, in their lives.
They fought dictatorial power, superstition, and injustice
with weapons no more lethal than those of argument and wit.
They gave their support to the virtues of tolerance, openness
to doubt, readiness to learn from criticism and from
experience. Courageously and energetically they laboured to
promote rationality in personal and social life.
Unfortunately, in developing the Enlightenment idea
intellectually, the philosophes blundered. They developed the
Enlightenment programme in a seriously defective form, and it
is this immensely influential, defective version of the
programme, inherited from the 18th century, which may be
called the "traditional" Enlightenment, that is built into
late 20th century institutions of inquiry. Our traditions and
institutions of learning, when judged from the standpoint of
helping us learn how to become more enlightened, are defective
in a wholesale and structural way, and it is this which, in
the long term, sabotages our efforts to create a more
civilized world, and prevents us from avoiding the kind of
horrors we have been exposed to during this century - wars,
third-world poverty, environmental degradation.
The Traditional Enlightenment
The philosophes of the 18th century assumed,
understandably enough, that the proper way to implement the
Enlightenment programme was to develop social science
alongside natural science. Francis Bacon had already stressed
the importance of improving knowledge of the natural world in
order to achieve social progress. The philosophes generalized
this, holding that it is just as important to improve
knowledge of the social world. Thus the philosophes set about
creating the social sciences: history, anthropology, political
economy, psychology, sociology.
This had an immense impact. Throughout the 19th centurythe diverse social sciences were developed, often by non-
academics, in accordance with the Enlightenment idea.
Gradually, universities took notice of these developments
until, by the mid 20th century, all the diverse branches of
the social sciences, as conceived of by the Enlightenment,
were built into the institutional structure of universities as
recognized academic disciplines.
The Romantic Opposition
The Enlightenment was opposed by Romanticism on the
grounds that it put far too much emphasis on reason.
Romanticism - stemming from such figures as Rousseau, Blake,
Wordsworth, Beethoven, Goethe - stressed the supreme value
of art, self-expression, personal feelings, imagination,
spontaneity, individuality, creativity, sympathetic
understanding, inspiration.
Romanticism was right to object to the traditional
Enlightenment, but wrong to object on grounds of too much
reason. What is wrong with the traditional Enlightenment is
that it lacks reason. It is a characteristic kind of
irrationality masquerading as rationality. In some respects
it is Romanticism, rather than the traditional Enlightenment
that embodies reason - especially when it stresses emotional
and motivational honesty. If the basic Enlightenment idea had
been put properly into practice, free of the blunders of the
traditional Enlightenment, there would have been no need for
the Romantic opposition: the Enlightenment would have been a
synthesis of Rationalism and Romanticism from the outset and
we, today, would possess a kind of inquiry well-designed from
the standpoint of helping us become civilized.
The New Enlightenment
In order to implement properly the basic Enlightenment
idea of learning from scientific progress how to achieve
social progress towards a civilized world, it is essential to
get the following three things right.
1. The progress-achieving methods of science need to be
correctly identified.
2. These methods need to be correctly generalized so that
they become fruitfully applicable to any human endeavour,
whatever the aims may be, and not just applicable to the
endeavour of improving knowledge.
3. The correctly generalized progress-achieving methods then
need to be exploited correctly in the great human
endeavour of trying to make social progress towards an
enlightened, civilized world.
Unfortunately, the philosophes of the Enlightenment got
all three points disastrously wrong. That the philosophes
made these blunders in the 18th century is forgivable; what is
unforgivable is that these blunders still remain unrecognized
and uncorrected today, over two centuries later. Instead of
correcting the blunders, we have allowed our institutions of
learning to be shaped by them as they have developed
throughout the 19th and 20th centuries.
There is, I regret, insufficient space for me to discuss
all three blunders: for that, see my From Knowledge to Wisdom
(Blackwell, 1984), and The Comprehensibility of the Universe(forthcoming). Here I shall consider only the third blunder,
by far the most dramatic and damaging.
I assume here that Karl Popper has correctly identified
the progress-achieving methods of natural science (step one);
and I assume that Popper's generalization of these methods,
when improved a little, adequately captures what we should
mean by progress-achieving rationality, fruitfully applicable,
potentially, to anything worthwhile that we might do (step
two). It is the third step that we will be concentrating on:
exploiting the strategies of reason properly to make social
progress towards a wise, enlightened world.
According to Popper, science makes progress by means of
the method of conjecture and refutation. In response to
problems, scientists put forward conjectured solutions which
they then assess by means of attempted empirical
falsification.
Popper generalizes this to form a conception of
rationality, critical rationalism. The decisive point, for
Popper, is that empirical falsification is just one especially
severe form of criticism. The scientific method of tackling
problems by means of conjecture and refutation becomes the
general method of tackling problems by means of conjecture and
criticism. Popper's conception of rationality, when improved
somewhat, can be summarized in the following four rules.
(i) Articulate and seek to improve the articulation of the
basic problem(s) to be solved.
(ii) Propose and critically assess alternative possible
solutions.
(iii) When necessary, break up the basic problem to be solved
into a number of preliminary, simpler, analogous,
subordinate or specialized problems (to be tackled in
accordance with rules (i) and (ii)), in an attempt to
work gradually towards a solution to the basic problem
to be solved.
(iv) Inter-connect attempts to solve basic and specialized
problems, so that basic problem-solving may guide, and
be guided by, specialized problem-solving.
The nub of Popper's critical rationalism is in rule (ii).
But rule (i) is required as well. In real life (as opposed to
academic examinations) we do not encounter problems clearly
and correctly formulated; recognition of the existence of a
problem may begin merely with the disappointment of some
unformulated expectation. Clarifying the nature of the
problem we seek to solve is a vital part of rational problem-
solving (and scientific research).
Rule (iii) becomes vital when a problem is too difficult
to solve at once. The fundamental scientific problem "What is
the nature of the universe?" is an example. We may regard the
Presocratic philosophers as trying to solve this problem all
at once, by putting forward rival conjectures, in accordance
with rule (ii); but this direct attack failed. Modern science
began when Galileo, Kepler and others tried to tackle
preliminary, subordinate problems within the framework of a
general answer to the fundamental scientific problem
(formulated by Galileo as "the book of Nature is written in
the language of mathematics").
Once rule (iii) is put into practice it is vital, also,to put rule (iv) into practice, so that efforts to solve
specialized and fundamental problems may learn from each
other, and so that absorption in specialized problems does not
lead to the basic problem to be solved being forgotten.
It might seem that the above transition from scientific
method to rationality loses the idea of learning from
experience; but this is not so. The above four rules do
constitute a method for learning from experience. Experience
is what we acquire through trying out various possible
solutions to the problem we wish to solve, and discovering
that these possibilities more or less fail. Experience, in
this broad sense, is a generalization of the notion associated
with science - observation and experimentation.
We come now to the all-important third step in the
Enlightenment programme.
According to the traditional Enlightenment (supported by
Popper), this third step involves applying the progress-
achieving methods of natural science to the task of developing
social science.
But the basic Enlightenment idea, remember, is to learn
from scientific progress how to make social progress towards
an enlightened world. This means that appropriately
generalized versions of the progress-achieving methods of
science need to be applied, not just to social science, but to
social life itself. The task must be to get into the fabric
of our personal and social lives strategies which will help us
to make progress towards better ways of living. We need to
extract from the one immensely successful institutional
enterprise of natural science those methods responsible for
this success, so that they may be generalized and applied to
other institutions - government, industry, agriculture, the
media, the law, international relations, education, the arts.
What matters is that social life makes progress towards
enlightenment, and not just that social science makes progress
towards greater knowledge of social phenomena.
Academic Inquiry to Promote Civilization
The proper task, then, is to get problem-solving in
personal, social, institutional and political life to exploit
the above four rules of rationality. Let us now consider what
the overall character of academic inquiry needs to be if it is
to help with the task of helping humanity solve the second
great problem of learning.
Two preliminary points.
First, in order to solve environmental problems, and
problems of civilization more generally, it is what we do (or
refrain from doing) that matters, and not just what we know.
Solutions to problems of living are appropriate human actions.
Even where new knowledge or technology is needed, in
connection with agriculture or medicine for example, it is
always what this enables us to do that solves the problem of
living.
Second, in order to make progress towards a sustainable,
civilized world we need to learn how to resolve our conflicts
in more cooperative ways than at present. There are degrees
of cooperativeness, from its absence, all out violence, at one
extreme, through settling of conflicts by means of threat,agreed procedures such as voting, via bargaining to all out
cooperativeness at the other extreme. If we are to develop a
sustainable, civilized world we need to move progressively
away from the violent end of this spectrum towards the
cooperative end.
Granted, then, that a basic task of academic inquiry is
to help us tackle our problems of living in cooperatively
rational ways so as to make progress towards civilization, the
basic intellectual work of academia will be (i) to articulate
personal, social and global problems of living, and (ii) to
propose possible solutions, possible actions, to be critically
assessed from the standpoint of their capacity, if enacted, to
enable us to realize what is of value in life. Academic
inquiry needs itself to engage in rational exploration of
problems of living in this way, and needs to promote the doing
of this in the world at large, by means of advocacy, argument,
debate, and education. Academic inquiry has the overall
social or political goal of helping humanity become more
cooperatively rational by cooperatively rational means.
These intellectually central and fundamental tasks,
undertaken in accordance with rules (i) and (ii), will be
performed by social inquiry and the humanities. Thus
economics, politics, sociology, psychology and anthropology
are not primarily sciences at all; they are not even non-
scientific disciplines devoted to acquiring knowledge of the
human world (as Romanticism holds). Their primary
intellectual task is to invent and explore imaginatively
diverse possible, more or less cooperative actions, diverse
possible ways of living, policies, economic and political
programmes, institutions, philosophies of life, and to assess
these critically from the standpoint of their desirability and
feasibility, their capacity, if implemented, to help us make
progress towards a good world. Social inquiry and the
humanities are primarily concerned to improve our ideas about
how to live rather than our ideas about what is the case.
Pursued in this way, social inquiry and the humanities form
the central, fundamental part of inquiry as a whole; they are
intellectually more fundamental than the biological, physical
and technological sciences (see diagram).
In addition, in order to do justice to the intractability
of many problems of living, inquiry will implement rule (iii),
and break up fundamental problems of living into a host of
subordinate, specialized problems of knowledge and know-how,
thus creating many subordinate, specialized disciplines.
Social inquiry itself needs to acquire knowledge of relevant
social phenomena, in order to aid articulation of problems of
living and assessment of proposed solutions. The
technological sciences tackle diverse technical problems of
know-how, thus enhancing our power to act, to solve our
problems of living, to achieve what is of value. The physical
and biological sciences tackle problems of knowledge and
understanding of diverse aspects of the natural world, thereby
improving our knowledge and understanding of what it is
possible and not possible to do in order to solve problems of
living. Mathematics, by contrast, is concerned to develop,
systematize and unify abstract problem-solving methods; it is
concerned with the exploration of problematic possibilities,thus enhancing our problem-solving powers.
All this more specialized problem-solving is however
inter-connected with thought about fundamental problems of
living, in accordance with rule (iv), so that each may guide
the other. (This does not mean, however that only those
specialized problems are tackled which are relevant to current
problems of living. Knowledge can be of value in its own
right; and some practical problems are only solved, or even
discovered, by research apparently unrelated to practical
needs.)
For each one of us, the most important and fundamental
inquiry going on in the world is the thinking that we engage
in as we live - the thinking that guides our actions. And
from the standpoint of building a better world it is this kind
of personally and socially active thought guiding personal and
social life that really matters. The basic task of academic
thought is to help enhance, by cooperatively rational means,
the quality of personally and socially active thought so that
it may all the better enable us to realize what is of value in
so far as this is compatible with a good world. The
intellectual progress of socially active thought is what
ultimately matters, the intellectual progress of academia
being but a means to that end.
In a sense, academic inquiry as a whole is a specialized
part of the more fundamental socially active inquiry which we
all engage in as we live. To the extent that this is true,
the relationship between academic thought, and thought in the
rest of the social world needs to comply with rule (iv): each
needs to learn from the other. Again, within academic
inquiry, social inquiry is more fundamental than natural
science, insofar as social inquiry tackles our fundamental
problems of living whereas natural science tackles subordinate
problems of knowledge.
In the diagram I have tried to indicate how the rules of
reason, (i) to (iv), being built into the institutional
structure of academic inquiry, affect both its internal
organization and its relationship to the rest of the social
world.
The basic intellectual aim of inquiry may be said to be,
not knowledge, but wisdom - wisdom being understood to be
the desire, the active endeavour and the capacity to realize
what is of value in life, for oneself and others. Wisdom
includes knowledge, know-how and understanding but goes beyond
them in also including the desire and capacity to help realize
what is of value. Wisdom, like knowledge, can be conceived of
not only in personal terms but also in institutional or social
terms. The basic task of rational inquiry is to help us
develop wiser ways of living, wiser institutions, a wiser
world.
It is essential that academic inquiry is without
political power, and is non-authoritarian in character. There
can be no question of academics deciding for the rest of us
what our problems are, how they should be solved, how we
should live or what is of value. Far from depriving us of the
power to decide for ourselves, the task of academic inquiry is
to help us enhance our power to decide well for ourselves by
providing us with good ideas, proposals and arguments for ourconsideration. Academic inquiry is a sort of people's civil
service, doing openly for the public, with exemplary
intellectual honesty and integrity, what actual civil servants
are supposed to do, in secret, for governments.
Academic inquiry must of course retain its independence,
and must not degenerate into merely serving the special
interests of government, industry, the nation, or public
opinion. The academic world needs just sufficient power and
authority to retain its independence, but no more.
So far nothing has been said about learning from
experience. But, as I indicated above, the four rules of
reason that we are considering are also rules for learning
from experience; this has a vital role to play in the
conception of inquiry we are considering. What we learn as a
result of attempting to put into practice some proposed
solution to a problem of living is of course all important for
learning how to build a better world. A vital task for
academic inquiry (especially for history) is to monitor the
successes and failures of our past attempts at solving
problems of living.
The conception of academic inquiry that we are
considering is designed to help us to see, know and
understand, for their own sake, just as much as it is designed
to help us solve practical problems of living (as I argue in
the books referred to above).
That the basic intellectual aim of inquiry is to help
realize what is of value in life has two further consequences.
First, it means that the arts have a vital rational
contribution to make to inquiry, as revelations of value, as
imaginative explorations of possibilities, desirable or
disastrous, or as vehicles for the criticism of fraudulent
values through comedy, satire or tragedy.
Second, it means that our feelings and desires have a
vital rational role to play within the intellectual domain of
inquiry. If we are to discover for ourselves what is of
value, then we must attend to our feelings and desires. But
not everything that feels good is good, and not everything
that we desire is desirable. Rationality requires that
feelings and desires take fact, knowledge and logic into
account, just as it requires that priorities for scientific
research take feelings and desires into account. In insisting
on this kind of interplay between feelings and desires on the
one hand, knowledge and understanding on the other, the
conception of inquiry that we are considering resolves the
conflict between traditional Rationalism and Romanticism, and
helps us acquire what we need if we are to contribute to
building civilization: mindful hearts and heartfelt minds.
This concludes my sketch of academic inquiry shaped by
the "new" Enlightenment. It differs dramatically from
academic inquiry as it mostly exists today. This is because
academic inquiry, as it actually exists, has been massively
influenced by the intellectually defective traditional
Enlightenment, and by the Romantic opposition. As a result,
we do not have today what we so urgently need, a kind of
academic inquiry rationally devoted to helping us create a
better world.Conclusion
In order to learn from our solution to the first great
problem of learning how to solve the second problem, we need
to bring about a revolution in academic inquiry, so that its
basic task becomes to help humanity devote reason to the
realization of what is of value in life. Would such a
revolution suffice to enable us to create a sustainable
civilization? Of course not! But it would help.